Man of Justice or Just of Histrionics?

Frank Kimbal Johnson

We are all supposed these days to have outgrown the ‘kings-and-queens’ type of history lesson. One doesn't have to be a self-styled historian to recognise that the forces which actually shape our world have little to do with the personal foibles, ambitions and family squabbles of ephemeral monarchs. History is a chronicle of competing power groups, sometimes defined by ideology, sometimes not, each seeking to enlarge its sphere of influence and territory by any means available. And there will always be certain individuals more than willing to serve an ideological cause not really as a matter of principle but in furtherance of their own ambition. The growing cynicism of the electorate is fuelled by revelations of the crude egotism and greed of politicians fond of cloaking themselves in high-sounding altruistic rhetoric.

Modern history affords no better example of ruthless self-aggrandisement posing as national leadership than the career of the late Winston Churchill. For over fifty years the public has been fed highly misleading and absurdly over-simplified versions of the ‘Churchill Story’; and the most recent example was The Gathering Storm television docudrama about Churchill's life and activities in the years leading up to the 1939-45 conflict with Germany. This got the usual ‘great-man-finally-recognised-as-such’ treatment, portraying Churchill as a great national leader kept in the political wilderness by lesser beings until the outbreak of hostilities.

Whatever the Second World War meant to anybody else (and this writer recalls finding his mother in tears in the kitchen after the news broke), it was splendid news for a man desperately anxious to prove himself a worthy descendant of the illustrious Duke of Marlborough. This ambition was reinforced by his need to redeem himself after his personal endorsement of the disastrous Gallipoli campaign in World War I, which gave political rivals every reason to distance themselves from his military adventuring.

Intriguing for office

In the years languishing at his grandiose country home he had whiled away the time in journalism, writing about his ancestors, painting in water-colours and intriguing with influential people to support his return to office.

No one seriously denies the need at that time for British preparedness in the face of German rearmament and expansionist policies; but Churchill was far from being alone in recognising this. From 1940, however, he was happily flexing his histrionic muscles as Prime Minister and ‘war leader’ for all the world to see, regardless of the disaster of Dunkirk and the dire state of the country. This was surely a time for sober appraisal of the European situation and how best to safeguard this country's longer-term interests without being bogged down in a mutually catastrophic war with Germany. In short, this was a time for real statesmanship.

And then, in May 1941, came the dramatic arrival of Rudolf Hess by parachute, bearing German proposals for an honourable and peaceful resolution of the conflict. These gave Britain an opportunity to end the war without diminishing her independence, power and influence in the world and allowing Germany to concentrate on the looming Soviet menace. But this presented Churchill himself with the horrifying prospect of peacetime mediocrity.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the luckless Hess was hastily bundled into permanent solitary confinement as a ‘war criminal’, leaving Churchill free to crank up the war machine for another four disastrous years. He needed to win a war, to be seen as a ‘warlord’, and that governed everything he said and did then and afterwards. All the sonorous and well rehearsed speech-making, the V-sign and the cigar-brandishing appearances were designed to keep the public in thrall to this consummate performer while the country's longer-term interests were being pawned for short-term American favours. The so-called ‘Hess incident’ justifiably looms over any assessment of Churchill's true place in Britain's history; and, such as it was, Churchill's stature as a national leader could only grow in Hitler's shadow. Still, while Hess was left to rot in Spandau prison for over 45 years, Churchill puffed big cigars and wrote his version of how, with a certain amount of help from the Americans and Russians, he had saved the world.

But the long-suffering British public had rumbled him by 1945, as the first post-war election demonstrated. The incalculable damage inflicted on this country by such self-aggrandisement is a fact not to be obscured by his ‘British Bulldog’ characterisation in the mass media. ‘American lapdog’ is how less sycophantic historians see him now.

Sulking in the wilderness

And his personal rancour towards Adolf Hitler was understandable enough: here was an ex-corporal from nowhere (albeit with two Iron Crosses) who had by sheer force of will raised Germany from ignominious defeat to European dominance while he - Marlborough's heir, no less - was just a part-time journalist still sulking in the political wilderness. Couple this personal rancour with indebtedness to Jewish financiers for support and with his overweening ambition, and what emerges is a monument to human vanity rather than a national hero. The tragedy is that so much was endured by so many so that publishers and TV programmers could perpetuate this insufferable mythology.

So we may have left the ‘kings-and-queens’ version of history behind, but it is high time we left the Churchill version behind as well. Churchill's egotism and theatrical brand of ‘patriotism’ were in no real sense decisive factors in our nation's history, except negatively. He never could distinguish a battle from a war, and he surrendered this nation's future for his vainglorious present. Astute and ruthless politician he was, yes; talented writer and speech-maker he was too; but national leader he never was, and his vision of Britain's future never extended much further than the smoke of his ever-present cigar. All things considered, therefore, the most appropriate salute to the Churchill myth is the one he was constantly seen giving, but the other way round.

Did Hitler Want War?

by Patrick J. Buchanan

On Sept. 1, 1939, 70 years ago, the German Army crossed the Polish frontier. On Sept. 3, Britain declared war.

Six years later, 50 million Christians and Jews had perished. Britain was broken and bankrupt, Germany a smoldering ruin. Europe had served as the site of the most murderous combat known to man, and civilians had suffered worse horrors than the soldiers.

By May 1945, Red Army hordes occupied all the great capitals of Central Europe: Vienna, Prague, Budapest, Berlin. A hundred million Christians were under the heel of the most barbarous tyranny in history: the Bolshevik regime of the greatest terrorist of them all, Joseph Stalin.

What cause could justify such sacrifices?

The German-Polish war had come out of a quarrel over a town the size of Ocean City, Md., in summer. Danzig, 95 percent German, had been severed from Germany at Versailles in violation of Woodrow Wilson’s principle of self-determination. Even British leaders thought Danzig should be returned.

Why did Warsaw not negotiate with Berlin, which was hinting at an offer of compensatory territory in Slovakia? Because the Poles had a war guarantee from Britain that, should Germany attack, Britain and her empire would come to Poland’s rescue.

But why would Britain hand an unsolicited war guarantee to a junta of Polish colonels, giving them the power to drag Britain into a second war with the most powerful nation in Europe?

Was Danzig worth a war? Unlike the 7 million Hong Kongese whom the British surrendered to Beijing, who didn’t want to go, the Danzigers were clamoring to return to Germany.

Comes the response: The war guarantee was not about Danzig, or even about Poland. It was about the moral and strategic imperative “to stop Hitler” after he showed, by tearing up the Munich pact and Czechoslovakia with it, that he was out to conquer the world. And this Nazi beast could not be allowed to do that.

If true, a fair point. Americans, after all, were prepared to use atom bombs to keep the Red Army from the Channel. But where is the evidence that Adolf Hitler, whose victims as of March 1939 were a fraction of Gen. Pinochet’s, or Fidel Castro’s, was out to conquer the world?

After Munich in 1938, Czechoslovakia did indeed crumble and come apart. Yet consider what became of its parts.

The Sudeten Germans were returned to German rule, as they wished. Poland had annexed the tiny disputed region of Teschen, where thousands of Poles lived. Hungary’s ancestral lands in the south of Slovakia had been returned to her. The Slovaks had their full independence guaranteed by Germany. As for the Czechs, they came to Berlin for the same deal as the Slovaks, but Hitler insisted they accept a protectorate.

Now one may despise what was done, but how did this partition of Czechoslovakia manifest a Hitlerian drive for world conquest?

Comes the reply: If Britain had not given the war guarantee and gone to war, after Czechoslovakia would have come Poland’s turn, then Russia’s, then France’s, then Britain’s, then the United States.

We would all be speaking German now.

But if Hitler was out to conquer the world — Britain, Africa, the Middle East, the United States, Canada, South America, India, Asia, Australia — why did he spend three years building that hugely expensive Siegfried Line to protect Germany from France? Why did he start the war with no surface fleet, no troop transports and only 29 oceangoing submarines? How do you conquer the world with a navy that can’t get out of the Baltic Sea?

If Hitler wanted the world, why did he not build strategic bombers, instead of two-engine Dorniers and Heinkels that could not even reach Britain from Germany?

Why did he let the British army go at Dunkirk?

Why did he offer the British peace, twice, after Poland fell, and again after France fell?

Why, when Paris fell, did Hitler not demand the French fleet, as the Allies demanded and got the Kaiser’s fleet? Why did he not demand bases in French-controlled Syria to attack Suez? Why did he beg Benito Mussolini not to attack Greece?

Because Hitler wanted to end the war in 1940, almost two years before the trains began to roll to the camps.

Hitler had never wanted war with Poland, but an alliance with Poland such as he had with Francisco Franco’s Spain, Mussolini’s Italy, Miklos Horthy’s Hungary and Father Jozef Tiso’s Slovakia.

Indeed, why would he want war when, by 1939, he was surrounded by allied, friendly or neutral neighbors, save France. And he had written off Alsace, because reconquering Alsace meant war with France, and that meant war with Britain, whose empire he admired and whom he had always sought as an ally.

As of March 1939, Hitler did not even have a border with Russia. How then could he invade Russia?

Winston Churchill was right when he called it “The Unnecessary War” — the war that may yet prove the mortal blow to our civilization.

HERE